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sentence. 18 Although the court found this claim to be defaulted, 19 it may
still be advisable for defense counsel to consider utilizing this type of
evidence in mitigation, particularly of the "future dangerousness" predi-
cate. In addition to its relevance as mitigation, the rationale is that a court
cannot prohibit the introduction of evidence that rebuts an aggravating
factor.20 The United States Supreme Court has observed that "evidence
18 Wilson, 249 Va. at 104 n.1, 452 S.E.2d at 675 n.1.
19 Id. See supra section I.
20 See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v.
that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated)
must be considered potentially mitigating." 21 Thus, the denial of this
type of evidence by the trial court would mean another potential federal.
claim for a defendant.
Summary and analysis by:
Michael H. Spencer
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
608 (1978) (plurality opinion).
21 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
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FACTS
Nineteen year-old James Madison University student Leanne
Whitlock was returning her boyfriend's car to him on January 5, 1990 in
Harrisonburg. 1 While she was stopped in traffic, Thomas David Strickler
forced his way into her car. His two companions, Ronald Henderson and
an unidentified blond woman, entered the car immediately afterwards.
Subsequently, the intruders brought Whitlock to a nearby cornfield,
where a witness saw them turn off the main road.2
Police searched the cornfield eight days later. They found
Henderson's wallet, Whitlock's clothing, and her body in quick succes-
sion. Her assailants had killed her by striking her head with a sixty-nine
pound rock. Later investigators discovered that Strickler had taken
Whitlock's driver's license, identification card, bank card, wristwatch,
and earrings. 3 Investigators also located hairs matching Strickler's on
Whitlock's clothing. They also found that the shirt Strickler had worn on
the day of the murder contained human blood stains and semen stains
consistent with Strickler's semen. Unidentified semen was also taken
from Whitlock's body.
4
At trial, the jury was instructed, inter alia, as to the crime of
capital murder, the meaning of "deadly weapon," and the crime of
robbery.5 As to capital murder, the jury was instructed as follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of capital murder.
The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant killed Leanne Whitlock; and
(2) That the killing was willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated; and
(3) That the killing occurred during the commission of
robbery while the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon,
or occurred during the commission of abduction with the intent
to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to
defile or was of a person during the commission of, or
subsequent to, rape.
6
1 Strickler v. Murray, 249 Va. 120, 122, 452 S.E.2d 648, 649
(1995).
2 Id. at 123, 452 S.E.2d at 649.
3 Id. at 123-24, 452 S.E.2d at 649-50.
4 Id. at 124,452 S.E.2d at 650.
5 Id. at 124-25, 452 S.E.2d at 650.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
As to the definition of"deadly weapon," thejury was instructed tha:
"a 'deadly weapon' is any object or instrument that is likely to cause
death or great bodily injury because of the manner, and under thc:
circumstances, in which it is used."7 As to the crime of robbery, the jury
was instructed as follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of robbery. The
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant intended to steal; and
(2) That a motor vehicle and other personal property was
taken; and
(3) That the taking was from Leanne Whitlock or in her
presence; and
(4) That the taking was against the will of the owner or
possessor, and
(5) That the taking was accomplished by violence to the
person or the threat of serious bodily harm.8
Strickler's attorney apparently did not object to any of the jur.
instructions.
The jury found Strickler guilty of capital murder (and fixed hi;
punishment at death), guilty of robbery (and fixed his punishment as lif
imprisonment), and guilty of abduction (and fixed his punishment as lif
imprisonment).9 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Strickler';
conviction, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. l'
Strickler later filed a petition for habeas corpus. He made several claim,
among them that his trial attorney's ineffective assistance of counse
should have served to invalidate his conviction. The Commonwealti
moved to dismiss, and the circuit court granted this motion. 11 Th
Supreme Court of Virginia granted Strickler an appeal limited to tw,
issues. First, Strickler contended that the trial court had erred in refusin
to vacate his sentence because the capital murder jury instructio
included the predicate offense of abduction with intent to defile. Thi
7 Id. at 125, 452 S.E.2d at 650.
8 Id.
9 ld. at 125-26, 452 S.E.2d at 650-51.
10 Stricklerv. Commonwealth, 241 Va.482,404S.E.2d227 (1991
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991).
11 Strickler, 249 Va. at 121-22, 452 S.E.2d at 648.
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offense cannot statutorily support a capital murder conviction if the
victim is age twelve or older, as was Whitlock. Second, Strickler asserted
that his trial attorney's failure to object to this instruction constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
12
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Strickler had procedurally
defaulted his claim that the capital murder instruction was erroneous
since he had failed to object to it at trial. 13 The court also held that
Strickler's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed since Strickler
was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the erroneous
inclusion of abduction with intent to defile as a predicate offense for




The abduction with intent to defile instruction was indeed errone-
ous. This offense may only serve as a predicate for capital murder in
Virginia if the victim is younger than twelve years. 16 Leanne Whitlock
was nineteen years old. 17 But the court decided that since there was
overwhelming evidence of both armed robbery and armed robbery with
a deadly weapon, Strickler would still have been convicted of capital
murder under that section18 without the erroneous abduction with intent
to defile instruction. 19
The court anchored its holding in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Strickland v. Washington.20 This decision held that defen-
dants seeking habeas corpus relief must prove two elements to establish
an ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim. First, the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient-in otherwords, the reviewing
court must assess "whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identi-
fied acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance." 21 From the facts, it seems clear that Strickler
proved this element easily. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia did
not address this point. It is not clear whether they failed to do so because
they felt it was obvious that Strickler had shown his trial counsel's
performance to be defective, or because they felt they did not need to
discuss the issue in light of what the court found to be Strickler's failure
to show the second element of an ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim,
prejudice.
22
12 Id. at 122, 452 S.E.2d at 648-49.
13 Id. at 126, 452 S.E.2d at 651.
14 Id. at 129-30, 452 S.E.2d at 652-53.
15 Id. at 130, 452 S.E.2d at 653.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (Supp. 1994) states in relevant part:
"The following offenses shall constitute capital murder, punishable as a
Class 1 felony: ... 8. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
of a child under the age of twelve years in the commission of abduction
as defined in § 18.2-48 when such abduction was committed... with the
intent to defile the victim of such abduction[."
17 Strickler, 249 Va. at 122, 452 S.E.2d at 649.
18 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (Supp. 1994).
19 Strickler, 249 Va. at 129-30,452 S.E.2d at 652-53.
20 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
22 In setting the tone for its review of Strickler's claim under
Strickland, the Supreme Court of Virginia quoted that decision's admo-
nition that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
To show the requisite prejudice, 23 a "defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome." 24 Applying this requirement, the Supreme Court
of Virginia stated that "[w/hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt."25 The court cited another United States Supreme Court decision,
Kimmelman v. Morrison,26 to explain that "Strickland's standard,
although by no means insurmountable, is highly demanding."
27
Consequently, the court held that Strickler had not shown the
requisite prejudice.28 The court decided that there was overwhelming
evidence that Strickler had committed the murder while committing
armed robbery, and that he had committed the armed robbery with a
deadly weapon. The court thus held that since Strickler would have been
found guilty of capital murder based on the armed robbery predicate
offense anyway, there was no reasonable probability that he would not
have been convicted of capital murder but for the erroneous abduction
with intent to defile instruction.2 9 In other words, since abduction with
intent to defile would not have been the only basis for Strickler's capital
murder conviction, there was no prejudice. Since there was no prejudice,
there was no cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
But this outcome is not as "open-and-shut" as might be assumed
from the opinion. In Stromberg v. California30 the United States
Supreme Court addressed situations such as Strickler's, where there are
two bases for a conviction and where one of those bases is unconstitu-
tional. In Stromberg itself there were three possible grounds for the
jury's verdict of guilty, one unconstitutional and two constitutional. The
Court held that a reviewing court could not conclude that the constitu-
tional bases were dispositive. 31 Thus, once one of the possible grounds
for a general verdict convicting a defendant has been declared unconsti-
tutional, the conviction must be remanded for a new trial.
32
First, Stromberg's analysis should apply whether the contested
basis is unconstitutional, unlawful, or impermissible as in Strickler's
case. Second, Stromberg suggests that allowing the general verdict to
stand would be constitutionally improper not so much because of the
particular unconstitutionality (or impermissibility) of one of the grounds,
but because of the more general unconstitutionality of assuming that the
jury convicted the defendant upon one of the legitimate grounds when
the truth is not actually known. Finally, the standard of proof in
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Therefore,
it seems likely that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not address the
"performance" arm of the Strickland test because it was unnecessary to
do so given that Strickler's claim could be disposed of based on the
"prejudice" arm.
23 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
24 Id. at 694.
25 Strickler, 249 Va. at 128, 452 S.E.2d at 652.
26 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
27 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382.
28 Strickler, 249 Va. at 129-30, 452 S.E.2d at 652-53.
29 Id.
30 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
31 Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 367-68.
32 Id. at 368.
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Stromberg appears to place the burden on the prosecution to show that the
illegitimate basis was not used to convict the defendant. Again, the jury's
verdict in Stromberg was a general one. The general verdict appears to
have been the dispositive factor in this case, as it was impossible to tell
which grounds the jury used to convict the defendant. 33 Thus, with a
general verdict the defendant need only show that one of the grounds was
unconstitutional. Presumably the burden is on the prosecution to show
that the illegitimate grounds were not used to convict the defendant.
Applying that reasoning here, Strickler's conviction could have
been based either on the abduction with intent to defile predicate offense
(illegitimate) or the armed robbery predicate offense (legitimate). Since
the jury's verdict does not clearly identify which offense it used to
convict Strickler, underStromberg the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot
assume that the jury convicted Strickler based on the legitimate (i.e.,
correctly-instructed) offense. The prosecution would have to show that
abduction with intent to defile was not used to convict Strickler.
Obviously defense attorneys should take care to insure that clients
are not convicted of capital murder based on a non-existent capital
murder offense. The first step is always to compare the evidence of the
offense in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to provisions
of section 18.2-31. The statute is complex. For example, it contains two
separate abduction sections-sections 18.2-31(1) and 18.2-31(8) (the
33 Id.
34 The Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed this issue many
times and has continually held that"[i]n a robbery prosecution, where the
violence against the victim and the trespass to his property combine in a
continuing, unbroken sequence of events, the robbery itself continues as
well for the same period of time." Linwood Earl Briley v. Common-
wealth, 221 Va. 532, 543, 273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980), cert. denied, 451
subject of this case). Both of these subsections in turn refer to another
statute, section 18.2-48. This statute covers drug-related homicides and
incorporates by reference several other Virginia statutory provisions, but
falls far short of encompassing all drug-related murders. If a statutory
section is inapplicable under any evidence that could be presented by the
Commonwealth, appropriate pre-trial actions may be taken to eliminate
the charge from the case. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse can
help defense counsel with this problem.
Additionally, if a claim is defaulted as in Strickler, Stromberg may
be of little help. Even though the Supreme Court of Virginia has broadly
construed robbery's requirement of forcible taking from the victim to
includetakings afterdeath, 34 that interpretation might well not have been
as clear to the jury. The jury might well have found that the murder was
committed during an abduction with intent to defile. Once no objection
wasmade, however, theissuewasevaluated andStrickland, notStromberg,
applied. The burden shifted to the defendant to prove prejudice-an
impossible task if the robbery evidence was sufficient and the real basis
for the guilty verdict was unknown.
Summary and analysis by:
Gregory J. Weinig
U.S. 1031 (1981); accord Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,
373-74,402 S.E.2d 218,224, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). See also
case summary of Quesinberry, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.
23 (1991); and Green, Narrowing the Scope of Capital Murder During
the Commission of a Robbery: When Must the Intent to Rob Arise?,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 4 5 (1993).
RAMDASS v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 518, 450 S.E.2d 360 (1994)
WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 485, 450 S.E.2d 361 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Bobby Lee Ramdass was convicted for the capital murder of
Mohammad Kayani. The capital murder charge was predicated on the
commission of murder during the commission of a robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon. 1 The jury fixed Ramdass' punishment at death,
based on the "future dangerousness" aggravator of Virginia's capital
murder statute. 2 The trial court imposed this sentence and sentences for
the underlying crimes.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this
judgement and the sentences imposed.4
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (Supp. 1994).
2 Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518,519,450 S.E.2d 360,
360 (1994).
3 Id. The court imposed a life sentence for the robbery and a four
year sentence for the firearms violation.
4 Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413,437 S.E.2d 566 (1993).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (Supp. 1994).
6 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1994).
Dwayne Allen Wright was convicted of two offenses of capital
murderforthekilling of SabaTekle in the commission of a robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon5 and the killing of Tekle subsequent tc
attempted rape.6 The jury fixed Wright's punishment at death based or
the "future dangerousness" aggravator.7 The trial court imposed this
sentence and other sentences for the underlying crimes.8 The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the judgments and sentence of death. 9
The United States Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari forbott
of these cases on June 20, 1994, vacating the judgments and remandinj
both cases "for further consideration in light of Simmons v. Soutt
Carolina."10
7 Wright v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 486,450 S.E2d 362 (1994)
8 Id. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the robbery, ter
years' imprisonment for the attempted rape, and two years imprisonmen
for the firearm violation.
9 Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 379 (1993)
10 Ramdass v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994); Wright v. Virginia
114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994).
11 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
